Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There Evidence ofJob-Lock? by Brigitte C. Madrian
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTh
INSURANCE AND JOB MOBILITY:
IS THERE EVIDENCE OF JOB-LOCK?
Brigitte C. Madrian
Working Paper No. 4476




I am grateful for many helpful discussions with Janet Currie, David Cutler, Peter Diamond,
Henry Farber, Jerry Hausman and James Poterba and acknowledge financial support from the
National Science Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and the National Institute
of Aging. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Public Economics. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4476
September 1993
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE AND JOB MOBILITY:
IS THERE EVIDENCE OF JOB-LOCK?
ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the impact of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility by
exploring the extent to which workers are "locked' into their jobs because preexisting conditions
exclusions make it expensive for individuals with medical problems to relinquish their current
health insurance. I estimate the degree of job-lock by comparing the difference in the turnover
rates of those with high and low medical expenses for those with and without employer-provided
health insurance. Using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, I estimate that
job-lock reduces the voluntary turnover rate of those with employer-provided health insurance






and NBERThe majority of privately insured Americans obtain their health
insurance through their own or a family member's employment. The
rationale for employers to provide health insurance is straighiforward. By
pooling the risks of individuals, employers can reduce adverse selection
and lower administrative expenses; in addition, they benefit from tax laws
allowing businesses to deduct their health insurance costs.These
advantages of employer provision must be weighed, however, against the
distortions they may generate in individual labor market decisions. In
particular, health insurance may distort job mobility if employees decide
to keep jobs they would rather leave for fear of losing coverage for
preexisting conditions,' a possibility that has been termed "job-lock."
This paper attempts to quantify the effect of employer-provided health
insurance on the labor market mobility of individuals.
The link between employer-provided health insurance and labor
market mobility is a potentially important factor in evaluating several
competing proposals to reform the U. S. health care system. To the extent
that these proposals affect the link between employment and health
insurance, they could have substantially different effects on the degree of
A preexisting condition is generally defined as any medical problem
which has been treated or diagnosed within the past six months to two
years. In some cases it may be more broadly defined as any medical
problem for which an individual has everreceivedcare or for which a
prudent person would have sought care even if no physician was actually
consulted.2
job-lock, yet there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between
health insurance and job mobility. Job-lock may also be an important
concern if there is a match-specific component of productivity that makes
workers more productive in some jobs than in others [Jovanovic, 1979}.
The productivity of the economy as a whole will suffer if individuals who
would like to move to more productive jobs are constrained to keep their
current positions simply to maintain their health insurance
To test for the presence of job-lock, I examine the relationship
between turnover, health insurance status, and expected medical expenses.
If job-lock is important, individuals with employer-provided health
insurance should be less likely to leave their jobs the higher are their
expected medical expenses. However, job-lock should only affect those
who actually have group employment health insurance. I estimate the
extent of job-lock using a difference-in-difference approach: the mobility
difference between those with high and low expected medical expenses
should be greater for those with employer-provided health insurance than
for those whose jobs do not include insurance. This test allows me to
distinguish the effect of employer-provided health insurance on mobility
from other factors related to mobility.I consider three different
"experimentaP groups: married men who have an alternative source of
coverage in addition to their own employer-provided health insurance,
heads of large families who are more likely to have high expected medical
expenses simply because of the size of their family, and married men
whose wives are pregnant. Using data from the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey, I estimate that job-lock reduces the voluntary
turnover rate of those with employer-provided health insurance by 25
percent.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides some
background on the link between health insurance and worker mobility.
Section II details the methodology I use to identify job-lock; this is
followed in Section III by a description of the data. The empirical results
are presented in Section IV, and the paper concludes in Section V.
I. Background and Motivation
There is abundant anecdotal evidence in support of insurance-
related job-lock. In a recent CBS/New York Times poil, 30 percent of
respondents answered "Yes" to the question "Have you or anyone else in
your household ever decided to stay in a job you wanted to leave mainly
because you didn't want to lose health coverage?" [New York Times,
September 6, 1991]. That so many individuals feel constrained by the
need for health insurance is telling evidence on the importance of health
insurance in job decisions. If employees knew that all of their illnesses
would receive identical coverage regardless of whether they worked,
where they worked, or how long they had been on the job, health
insurance would not be a deterrent to worker mobility.
The problem, however, is that employees do not necessarily
receive identical coverage when they change jobs because 57 percent of
employers exclude preexisting conditions, typically for six months to two
years, in their health plans [Cotton, 1991]. Although small firms are more
likely to impose these exclusions (64 percent of firms with under 500
employees), 45 percent of firms with more than 10,000 employees had
them as well. In addition, half of full-time workers face length-of-service
requirements before being eligible for any insurance [Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 19891.There is also a growing trend toward medical4
underwriting, especially in small firms, in order to exclude serious
ailments from coverage entirely.2
In its 1985 COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act) legislation, Congress attempted to ease the burden of possibly losing
covering by mandating that employers provide terminating employees with
the option to continue their coverage for up to 18 months .However,
the cost of COBRA to the employee (102 percent of the employer's
premium) may be prohibitively high at a time when individuals can least
afford it (Spencer Associates [1991] reports that the average monthly
COBRA health insurance premium for family coverage was $300 in 1990).
Job-lock may be further exacerbated by the importance of
experience rating in setting a firm's health insurance premiums. For small
employers, one major illness may significantly increase the firm's
premiums for several years. To avoid this possibility, employers may
discriminate by refusing to hire employees with health problems, or when
such events occur, they may cancel their policies altogether. Although the
Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits screening for health in hiring,
it places no constraints insurers; a firm's insurance company may exclude
an individual from coverage or drop the plan entirely if the firm hires an
employee with sufficiently high medical costs. Fear of this event may
2 Medical underwritingoccurs when certain medical conditions are
excluded on an individual basis for the life of the insurance policy. For
example, if an individual has had cancer, the insurance company may
underwrite the policy to exclude any further expenses related to cancer for
that individual. Such underwriting is often a precondition to providing
insurance in small firms.
Gruber and Madrian [1993] examine the extent to which the
availability of continuation coverage mitigates the effects of job-lock.5
discourageindividuals from moving to small firms or leaving a job where
they know their insurance premiums will not fluctuate.
IL. Identifying Job-Lock
To study the phenomenon of job-lock, one would ideally like
information on individual and family health status, worker mobility, and
the health insurance plans of both the firm for which an individual works
andtowhich an individual could move. Unfortunately, information on
health status and health insurance is not widely available in labor force
surveys, information on worker mobility is not typically available in health
surveys, and information on insurance plans of companies for which an
individual couldhaveworked is nonexistent. An alternative approach is
to identify two groups of workers who are similar in all respects except for
either their health status or their insurance status and then compare the
mobility of these two groups. I consider three factors associated with
health and insurance status which should affect the cost of relinquishing
health insurance upon changing jobs and then examine the mobility rates
of individuals affected by these cost factors for evidence of job-lock.
A. Cost Factor 1: Having Other Health Insurance
The first division is between those who have an alternative source
of coverage as well as their own employer-provided health insurance and
those who do not. Table I lists the fraction of married men who report
coverage from various sources of insurance. Although employers are the
predominant provider of health insurance, more than one-third of the men
with employer-provided insurance have an alternative source of insurance
not attached to their own employment. For most men, this secondary6
source is the employer-provided insurance received by their working
wives; other sources include Medicaid, CHAMPUS, and individual
nongroup policies.
A useful framework for considering the effect of job-lock is
provided by the following matrix of mobility rates by employer-provided
and other health insurance status, where M represents the probability of




No Other HI M M01
Other HI M10 M11
Because job-lock is caused by the potential loss of health insurance
coverage associated with changing jobs, we would not expect those with
coverage through both their own employment andanoutside source to
face job-lock. A simple test for the magnitude of job-lock, therefore, is
whether those with employer-provided health insurance and other coverage
are more likely to turnover than those without alternative coverage, or
M11 -M>0.This will provide a consistent estimate of job-lock as long
as individuals with other health insurance are not more likely to change
jobs for reasons unrelated to job-lock. There may, however, be grounds
to believe that mobility will be greater for those with other health
insurance for reasons other than job-lock. For example, a man whose wife
has employer-provided health insurance also has a secondary source of
income, something which might increase mobility as well. A second test7
for job-lock, therefore, is whether having other health insurance increases
mobility more for those who have employment-based health insurance than
for those who do not, or
(M11 -M01)-
(M10-M)> 0.
This difference-in-difference estimate for the effect of job-lock is
consistent under the assumption that the independent effect of other health
insurance on mobility is the same for those with employer-provided health
insurance as it is for those without employer-provided health insurance.
It is important to note that looking at the effect of health insurance
on mobility (M -Mor M10 -M1)cannotbe construed as a test for job-
lock, as health insurance could be correlated with other unobserved job
attributes that also tend to reduce mobility. For example, jobs which
include health insurance benefits may also be "better" along other
dimensions, such as providing a pension or paid vacation days. The two
difference estimators proposed avoid this objection.
B. Cost Factor 2: Expected Medical Expenses and Family Size
Because job-lock should be more severe for those who most need
health insurance, a second "experiment" for job-lock compares mobility
rates for those with and without high expected medical expenses.
Although the data which I use do not include good measures of health
status, one variable that should be correlated with expected medical
expenses is family size. Larger families will have higher absolute medical
expenses because they will make more routine visits to the doctor; it is
also more likely that there will be a considerable medical expense in a8
larger family simply because there are more people who might have
something go wrong.
If the expected medical expenses associated with family size
decrease mobility, then among those with employer-provided health
insurance, individuals with small families should be more likely to change
jobs than individuals with large families. To the extent that job mobility
and geographic mobility are related, we might expect lower job turnover
among those with large families simply because the costs associated with
moving geographically are greater.If family size exerts this type of
independent effect on mobility, an additional test for job-lock which
separates out this confounding effect is whether the differential mobility
rate between small and large families is greater for those who have
employer-provided health insurance than for those who do not.
C. Cost Factor 3: Expected Medical Expenses andPregnancy
Another easily identifiable group with large anticipated medical
expenses is those who are expecting the birth of a child. The Health
Insurance Association of America reported in 1989 that average costs for
a normal pregnancy and delivery were $4,334 while average cesarean
costs were $7, 186. While looking at the mobility of pregnant women may
be problematic since many women choose to leave the labor force (at least
temporarily) when they have a baby, these objections should be less severe
when considering the mobility decisions of their husbands.
A third test for job-lock, therefore, is whether among men
employer-provided health insurance, those whose wives are pregnant are
less likely to change jobs than those whose wives are not pregnant. As
with family size and other health insurance, looking purely at the effect of9
pregnancy among those with health insurance may not be sufficient to
identify job-lock if there are reasons why individuals who are expecting
a baby may have different mobility patterns than everyone else.4 Once
again, however, we can look at whether having a pregnant wife reduces
mobility more for men who have employer-provided health insurance than
for men who do not.
D. Empirical implementation
Empirically, the effect of job-lock is estimated from the following






Health Cost * 3 InsuranceFactor
(As)
where the vector z is a vector of observable demographic characteristics
(such as education) and the cost factors are those just described: having
other non-employment-related health insurance, family size, and
pregnancy. This type of probit (or logit) specification has been used
For example, the onset of fatherhood may have a "settling" effect on
an individual's lifestyle, or individuals may not want to cope with the
stress of changing jobs and having a baby at the same time.10
extensively in the existing empirical literature examining job turnover.5
The relationship between the estimated /s and the tests of job-lock
is straightforward. Using the other health insurance experiment in the
previously shown mobility matrix, the estimated constant term, f3,
corresponds to the mobility rate (conditional on z) for individuals who
have no health insurance coverage, either by themselves or through
someone else. j3andf2givethe marginal impact on mobility associated
with holding employer-provided health insurance (fl1)andhaving other
health insurance (I2); and 13 gives the extra impact on mobility generated
by having both sources of health insurance coverage. The tests of job-
lock, therefore, are tests about the sign and magnitude of the estimated fls.
The actual estimation is complicated by the fact that in my data,
I observe individuals at two points in time separated by intervals of
between 7 and 15 months. The only information I have on turnover is
whether the individual is on the same job at the end of the interval as at
These include several studies which examine the impact of fringe
benefits, particularly pensions, on turnover [Mitchell, 1982 and 1983;
McCormick and Hughes, 1984; Bartel, 1982; Bartel and Borjas, 1977;
Schiller and Weiss, 1979}. Generally these studies conclude that pensions
and other fringe benefits are associated with lower mobility rates, although
it is not clear whether this is because pensions are typically nonportable
or because pensions are correlated with other favorable aspects of a job
[Gustman and Steinmeier, 1987 and 1990].
See Mortensen [19861 and Mitchell [1983] for a model of job
turnover that explicitly derives this type of estimating equation in a utility
maximization framework.
This is a problem of other panel data sets as well. In the PSID, time
between interviews also varies from 7 to 15 months, while in the NLSY
it varies from 9 to 20 months.11
the beginning. Thus, I know whether or not an individual changed jobs
at least once.
If P, denotes the probability that individual i changes jobs in any
given month t,thenthe probability that individual i does not change jobs




Similarly,the probability of at least one job change over the same interval
is
(2) (Probabilityof\ =1—ii(1-P )
\Changing Jobs!1.f
I'
Ifthe probability of job change in any month is independent of
that in any other month, these two probabilities reduce to
Probability of \= (1— , = 1!—'1'(A )\fl*
\NotChanging Jobs J. /
(3)
(Probability of=1-(1 -P.)tm =1-(1-(A.))tm. Changing Jobs
If, however, individuals have different underlying propensities to change
jobs (i.e., there are "movers" and "stayers"), these probabilities may not
be independent. To explicitly account for this,I also include an
individual-specific random effect, O, in the estimation. I assume that 0. is
distributed normally with mean 0 and variance o, a parameter which will
also be estimated. The respective probabilities of changing jobs and not
changing jobs are now given as12
(Probabilityof =(1-P) = 11-(A+)\= VVot Changing Jobs
II
(4)
[Probability 01 1-(1-P.)m= 1-(1-(A. +
O.))m. ChangingJobsj
I
Forthose who change jobs, their individual contribution to the likelihood
function is
(5) L = J[1_(1_(A1+o1))m1 .f(O)dO,
while for those who do not change jobs,
(6) L1 = J(i- (4 + 6))m .f(O)dO.
III. Data: 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
The data I use come from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure
Survey (NMES) conducted by the Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research (AHCPR). This survey of approximately 14,000 households
(38,446 individuals) collected detailed information about health status,
health insurance, and medical care utilization in 1987 through a series of
four interviews. Additionally, several questions relating to employment
were asked during each of the four interview rounds. I restrict the sample
to married men ages 20-55 who were full-year eligible respondents,
employed but not self-employed at the first interview, and married to the13
same individual at the first and fourth interviews.7 The final sample
consisted of 2978 individuals.
The dependent variable used in all specifications equals 1 if the
individual changed jobs voluntarily. The data include an indicator variable
for whether an individual held a different job at the last interview than in
previous interviews. I code these individuals as well as those who are not
employed at the final interview as job changers (everyone in the sample
is employed at the first interview). There are also three questions in each
round regarding whether an individual is currently laid-off or spent any
time during the previous round on layoff. If the individual changed jobs
and answered yes to any of these layoff questions after the first round, I
assume that the individual changed jobs involuntarily.Therefore,
voluntary job-changers are coded as those who either changed jobs
between the first and the fourth interview or who became unemployed and
who did not spend any time on layoff after the first In my
sample, 16 percent of individuals changed jobs and 12 percent changed
voluntarily. These numbers are not out of line with one year mobility
rates reported elsewhere. Although the empirical results reported are
confined to an examination of voluntary mobility, it should be noted that
Military personnel are not included in the sample because they are
considered Thut-of-scopeTM while they are in the military.
This measure may slightly overstate the degree of voluntary mobility
if there are individuals who were laid-off but did not spend any time
unemployed (since questions regarding layoff were only asked of those
who were or had been unemployed). Data from the January 1987 Current
Population Survey suggest that 23 % of those who lost the job they held a
year previously found a new job within 2 weeks. If none of these
individuals experienced any unemployment, this would lower fraction of
those who left their jobs voluntarily by 1% at most (from 12% to 11%).14
the results are very similar when the dependent variable equals 1 for any
job change, voluntary or involuntary.
Table II presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the
analysis. Some details of their construction follow. In addition to other
demographic variables such as race, union status and education, experience
is included as an independent variable in all specifications. Because the
1987 NMES asks how many years an individual spent not working after
age 21 for several reasons including school, caring for children, and poor
health, I adjust the traditionally used measure of labor market experience,
age-education-6, to account for any additional time spent out of the labor
forceY The wage variable used was constructed by the Agency for Health
Care Policy Research (AHCPR) using information on wage and salary
payments, the time period covered by the payment (i.e. hourly, weekly,
monthly), and the usual number of hours and days worked. The family
and individual income variables were also constructed by AHCPR.
All three experiments used to test for job-lock include a dummy
variable for whether or not an individual actually holds an employment-
related health insurance policy. 72.5 percent of my sample are coded as
holding such health insurance. The first experiment, which uses other
health insurance to identify job-lock, also includes a dummy variable equal
to I if an individual is covered by another source of health insurance
(union, CHAMPUS, nongroup, and spousal health insurance).
The second experiment uses family size to identify job-lock.
Family size should only matter, however, if an individual's health
Because most men do not typically spend much time out of the labor
force for reasons other than education, this measure of experience and the
traditional measure are not that different.15
insurance policy actually covers others in the family. Unfortunately, the
1987 NMES does not give information about the source of coverage for
individuals who are covered but do not actually hold a policy.I have
therefore constructed two measures of whether a husband's employer-
provided health insurance covers others.
In both cases I have assumed that if the husband is the only family
member with group employment health insurance and his spouse or
children are covered by this type of insurance, then the husband's policy
covers everyone. In my conservative estimates, I have further assumed
that if both parents hold employer-provided health insurance, the husband
only covers himself. This will obviously understate the extent to which an
individual covers others. Using this criterion, 51.3 percent of the sample
(and 68 percent of those who have employer-provided health insurance)
have health insurance that covers others.
In the liberal estimates I have assumed that if the children and
wife are covered and the husband holds a group employment policy, then
this policy covers everyone, regardless of whether or not the wife also
holds group employment insurance. With this definition, 62.8 percent of
the sample (83.4 percent of those with employer-provided insurance) have
insurance that covers others. This estimate will overstate the coverage of
others (especially to the extent that individuals do not have the option of
family coverage), but is likely closer to the truth than the conservative
estimate. A comparison with similar data from the May 1988 Current
Population Survey suggests that this bias is likely to be small.'° Even if
'°Ina similar sample of married men from the May 1988 CPS, 64.9%
have employer-provided health insurance which covers others and this is
79.1 % of those with such insurance. These numbers are very close to the16
individuals do not actually elect family coverage, theymay usually add
other family members to their policy outside the open-enrollmentperiod
if other family members have lost their insurance due to achange in the
spouse's employment)1
In determining coverage from a wife's health insurance policy I
have assumed that if the wife holds employer-provided healthinsurance,
her husband is also covered)2 This corresponds to the liberalmeasure
for covering children just described. In principle I could also makea
conservative measure of coverage by a wife's policy analogous to that for
covering children, but it would not be possible to identify job-lock in the
estimation. With a conservative measure, only those who do not have
employer-provided health insurance could be coded as havingcoverage
through a wife's policy. An interaction between havingyour own
employer-provided health insurance and being covered by a wife's health
insurance would therefore equal zero for everyone.
The third experiment identifies job-lock usingpregnancy as a
preexisting condition. Because I only observe births and notpregnancy,
numbers I have calculated with the liberal estimate of covering others.
Neither measure, however, accounts for the possibility thatan
individual could have coverage through his or her employment but does
not even elect individual coverage because he or she already hascoverage
elsewhere.
12 Using thisdefinition, 33.5%ofmy sample are coded as having
health insurance through their spouse's employment. In theMay 1988
CPS, 33.9% of married men have wives with employer-provided health
insurance. Of these women, 80% have insurance whichcovers others in
the family, a figure roughly similar to that for men in both the NMES and
the CPS.17
I construct two measures of pregnancy. The first is simply a dummy
variable for whether or not a baby was born between the first interview
and December 31, 1987. The second is the fraction of time between the
first interview and the end of the year during which an individual's wife
was pregnant)3 Using this second measure gives a stronger test of job-
lock. Among those who have employer-provided health insurance,
individuals whose children are born shortly after the first interview should
be more likely to change jobs than individuals whose children are born at
the end of the year. This is because after the baby is born, the deterrent
to mobility which kept the individual from changing jobs is gone
(assuming the baby is healthy). Unfortunately, since I do not have
information about births after the end of 1987, neither measure accounts
for pregnancies that were ongoing at the end of the year. This lack of
information will bias the estimate of pregnancy-related job-lock downward
because the mobility of the control group will be contaminated by some
individuals who are also actually affected by job-lock.
IV. Empirical Results
Tables 3-5presentthe empirical results from estimating the
probability of changing jobs as a function of the cost factors outlined
previously. All specifications include the demographic variables described
previously as well as 5industryand 4 occupation dummies (although these
L3Althoughbirthdays are not reported in the NMES, I can identify the
date of birth for children born after January 1, 1987 and before December
31, 1987 because they are only eligible for the survey once they are born
and I know the number of days for which an individual was eligible for
inclusion.18
coefficients are not reported). Except where noted, all specifications
include the full sample of 2,978 men
The first column in Table III lists the coefficients from a simple
probit equation for turnover which does not include any of the variables
used to identify job-lock. Wages, union status, and experience are all
negatively associated with turnover, while the effects of education and race
are insignificant. As expected, the time between interviews increases the
likelihood of turnover.
The second column of Table III adds a variable for whether or not
the individual has employer-provided health insurance. The estimated
coefficient is highly significant and implies that workers in jobs with health
insurance have a 60 percent lower likelihood of turnover than equivalent
workers in jobs without health insurance. Note that when health insurance
is included as a regressor, the impact of wages falls substantially, by about
one half.'4 Moreover, the coefficient on health insurance is substantially
larger than that on wages.This suggests that increasing employer
spending on health insurance has a greater effect on turnover than an
equivalent increase in wages.'5 As mentioned previously, however, the
14
Althoughthis reduction of the wage coefficient may seem large,
Mitchell (1982) finds a similar result for pensions. In her study, including
a dummy variable for whether or not an individual has a pension reduces
the wage coefficient by 40 percent.
A recent poll asked how much extra wage income individuals would
have to receive in order to give up their employer-provided health
insurance [Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1991].The mean
response was $4,850 (in contrast, the average cost of providing health
insurance was $2,748 per employee in 1989.) If employees value health
insurance just as they value wages, then the effect of health insurance
should be similar to the effect of increasing income by $5,000 per year.19
effect of health insurance alone cannot be construed as evidence of job-
lock because jobs which provide health insurance typically provide many
other benefits as well.
A. Cost Factor 1: Having Other Health Insurance
To examine the effect of job-lock, the third column of Table HI
includes Other Hf and its interaction with Health Insurance as regressors.
The two tests for job-lock outlined previously are presented in the bottom
panel of Table III (because both hypotheses concerning job-lock are one-
sided, the reported p-values correspond to a one-tailed test). The first is
whether among those with employer-provided health insurance, those who
have other health insurance should be more likely to change jobs than
those who do not have alternative coverage. The statistic for this test,
12+I3,ispositive (.171) with a p-value of .017. The second test statistic,
for whether having other health insurance increases mobility more among
those with employer-provided health insurance than among those without
it, is simply I3(thecoefficient on the interaction between employer-
provided health insurance and other health insurance). It is also positive
(.211) with a p-value of .058. Both of these test give strong evidence of
insurance-related job-lock.
The actual effect of job-lock may be more easily seen, however,
by once again considering a mobility matrix, this time with the estimated
probability of changing jobs over a 12 month period in each cell (standard
Because most income is wage income, we would therefore expect the
coefficient on health insurance to be smaller than that on wages if
employees value wages and health insurance equally.20
errors are in parentheses))6 The turnover probability is calculated for
a representative individual: a white, 38-year old man with 13 years of
schooling and 19 years of experience who works in a non-union
manufacturing job as a craftsman, earns an hourly wage $11.50, and has
a total family income of $36,000.
The predicted probability of turnover for an individual with no
health insurance is .256.Similarly, the turnover probability for an
individual with employer-provided insurance but no other source of
coverage is .085 (as expected, mobility is much lower for those with
employer-provided health insurance than for those without).T h e
striking feature of this matrix is that while individuals with other health
insurance only are slightly less (5.1 percent) likely to change jobs than
individuals with no health insurance, individuals with both sources of
health insurance are much more (26.0 percent) likely to change jobs than
those who only have employer-provided health insurance.




17Thesecharacteristics correspond roughly to the averages in the
sample (or the mode for categorical variables). The average probabilities
for everyone in the sample look very similar to those computed for the
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Three estimates of job-lock are presented below the matrix. The
first estimate gives the increased mobility of those with both sources of
health insurance over those with only employer-provided health insurance
(column 2) and suggests that job-lock is responsible for a 26 percent
reduction in mobility (this calculation uses those with other health
insurance, who should not affected by job-lock, as the base group). The
next two estimates of job-lock attempt to account for any independent
effect of other health insurance on mobility. A simple difference-in-
difference estimate, the row difference in the second column minus that in
the first column, gives an estimate for job-lock of 31.1 percent (26.0-(-
5.1)). An alternative (adjusted) difference-in-difference estimate can be
obtained by comparing the actual mobility rate of those with both sources
of health insurance to the counterfactual mobility rate of this group if the
effect of other health insurance were the same as for those without
employer-provided health insurance. The row difference in column 122
suggests that other health insurance reduces mobility by 5.1 percent among
those who do not have employer-provided health insurance; if the effect
is similar for those who do have employer-provided health insurance, then
the mobility rate of those with both sources of health insurance would be
.081 rather than .115.18 The magnitude of job-lock is then a 29.6
percent ((.115- .081)!. 115) reduction in mobility among those with
employer-provided health insurance. Because other health insurance alone
does not have a substantial impact on mobility (as suggested by the small
row difference in column 1), the measure of job-lock computed from the
simple row difference among those with employer-provided health
insurance and both difference-in-difference estimates are quite similar.'9
The last row of Table III gives the range of these estimates as the degree
of job-lock
The last column in Table III gives the results from estimating a
random effects probit model for turnover (obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function specified in equations 6 and 7).Note that the
coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are not directly comparable because those
for the simple probit give the effect on between-interview turnover while
18 The number .081 is derived by dividing .085 (the mobility rate of
those with only employment-based insurance) by 1.051 because the
mobility rate of those with only other health insurance is 5.1 % lower than
that of individuals with no health insurance.
' Given the similarity between the two difference-in-difference
estimates of job-lock, some may question the need for an adjusted
estimate. The adjusted estimate is actually preferable because it is possible
for the simple estimate to exceed 100%, and a reduction in mobility
greater than 100% does not make sense. The two estimates are similar
here because the row difference in column 1 is so small. It will matter,
however, when we come to the pregnancy "experiment".23
those for the random effects probit correspond to monthly turnover. The
relative magnitudes, however, are very similar (Le, the coefficient on
health insurance is roughly twice that on wages in both specifications), as
are the predicted probabilities of job change over a 12-month interval.
While the stanthrd errors are slightly larger using the random effects
specification, the qualitative results are very similar: job-lock accounts for
a 25-30 percent reduction in mobility.
Because the predominant source of other health insurance comes
from a spouse's employment it is possible that the effect of other health
insurance is in reality the effect of having a working wife.2° Certainly
having a second source of income in the family would make it easier for
an individual to give up his current job if he had not yet lined up another.
To control for this, I have also included family income and wife's income
as regressors. Although the results are not reported, the coefficient
estimates on I2and/3 are virtually unchanged when these income
measures are included, and the estimates of job-lock are likewise very
similar. These results suggest that the increased mobility for men whose
wives also have health insurance does not merely capture the impact of
having a working spouse. This conclusion is further supported when the
estimation is confined solely to those men whose wive's are working. In
this case both tests of job-lock are actually more significant than those for
the full sample despite a 40 percent reduction in sample size, and the
estimated magnitude of job-lock is larger (36 percent to 51 percent). Once
20Fo the extent that having a working spouse precludes making job
changes that also entail moving geographically, these estimates of job-lock
may actually be understated.24
again, controlling for family income, wife's income or wife's wages do not
alter the results substantially.
B. Cost Factor 2: Expected Medical Expenses and Family Size
Table III moves to the second job-lock experiment in which family
size is used as a proxy for expected medical expenses. The actual
equation estimated is the same as before except that 2nowcorresponds
to family size (rather than other health insurance) and /3 to the interaction
between having employer-provided health insurance that covers others and
family size. As before, we can consider two tests of job-lock: whether
having health insurance that covers others reduces mobility more for
individuals with large families (132+/33<0), and whether the differential
mobility between small and large families is greater for those with
employer-provided health insurance than for those without it. (/33<0).21
Asmentioned in the description of the data, I use both a
conservative and a liberal measure of whether the husband's health
insurance covers others in the family (column 1 and column 2 of Table
IV). In both cases, the tests for /32+133 and for J3 alone suggest evidence
of job-lock. Although the effects are much more significant for the
conservative test, the actual estimates are almost identical. Using the
conservative measure of covering others gives a stronger test of job-lock
because when using the liberal measure, the effect of covering others will
be partially offset by the fact that having a wife with employer-provided
2!Thepredicted signs are opposite those in the other health insurance
case because having other health insurance should increase mobility for
those with employer-provided health insurance while having a large family
should decrease mobility.25
health insurance reduces job-lock. The third column of Table IV looks
only at families for whom the wife does not have employer-provided
health insurance and, as could be expected, the results on job-lock in
column 3 are stronger and of a greater magnitude than those in column 2.
In all three cases, family size has a negative impact on mobility, but this
effect is insignificant. The last column in Table IV gives the results from
estimating a random effects probit using the full sample and the
conservative estimate of covering others. As was the case with other
health insurance, the results from estimating a random effects probit
looking at family size (presented in the last column of Table 4) are






1 Child .253(.027) .092(.012)
5 Children .224(.041) .051(.014)
Estimates of Job-Lock









The magnitude of job-lock can once again be derived from the
predicted probabilities in a mobility matrix. In this case, the estimates
come from the results in column I of Table 4 with the probabilities in the26
first row corresponding to an individual with one child, while those in the
second row correspond to an individual with 5 children. Although family
size decreases the probability of changing jobs regardless of health
insurance status, the negative effect of family size on turnover is much
larger for those with employer-provided health insurance. Not only is the
relative reduction in mobility larger (44.5 percent versus 11.6 percent),
but the absolute reduction in mobility is larger as well (.041 versus .029).
Looking only at the difference in mobility rates of large and small
families among those with health insurance, the estimated effect of job-
lock is a 44.5percentreduction in mobility among those with employer-
provided health insurance.Accounting for the negative (albeit
insignificant) effect of family size using a simple difference-in-difference
estimate gives a more conservative measure of job-lock (33 percent), while
the adjusted difference-in-difference estimate effect of job-lock from
having four additional children would be to reduce mobility by 37 percent.
These estimates of job-lock obviously depend on the arbitrarily chosen
family size for the small and large family. Comparing a family of 2
children with a family of 4 children gives a difference-in-difference
estimate of job-lock of about 25 percent.
C. Cost Factor 3: Expected Medical Expenses and Pregnancy
Results using pregnancy as a preexisting condition are presented
in Table 5. The first two columns use the percent of timepregnant as the
measure of pregnancy, while the last two columns use a dummy variable
for whether or not the individual had a baby. In the estimated equation,
now corresponds to pregnancy while 133 corresponds to the interaction
between pregnancy and employer-provided health insurance. The two tests27
for job-lock are whether pregnancy reduces mobility among those who
have health insurance (/3 + /3 <0) and whether health insurance reduces
mobility more for those who are expecting a child than for those who are
not expecting (I3<0).
As columns 1 and 3 of Table 5show,both measures of pregnancy
suggest evidence of job-lock and, as expected, using the fraction of time
pregnant does give stronger results. Looking only at the individuals most
likely to have children, those aged 20-39, does not alter the results
significantly (columns 2 and 4). The last column of Table 5presentsthe
results from estimating a random effects probit corresponding to the simple
probit in column 1. As before, the results from the random effects probit
and the simple probit are qualitatively similar.
The tests of job-lock in the pregnancy experiment are less
compelling than those from the other health insurance and family size
experiments. While the test of /33 <0 is significant, the simple test of
/33 +/33 <0 is only significant at the 70 percent to 80 percent level. The
significance of the difference-in-difference estimator flisdue largely to
the fact that among individuals who do not have employer-provided health
insurance, pregnancy actually increases mobility (/3>0). This result may
seem counterintuitive, however, it should not seem too surprising that
these individuals may be motivated to find better jobs precisely because
they are expecting a child.Since not all firms exclude preexisting
conditions, there is a chance that an individual in a job which does not
currently provide health insurance will find a new job which provides
health insurance that will pay for the delivery.
Even though the test /32+133 is not as significant as that from the
other health insurance and family size experiments, its magnitude is still28
large enough that it gives evidence of job-lock within the range of the
previous two experiments. This is shown in the mobility matrix below
based on column 1 of Table 5. Note that among those who do not have
employer-provided health insurance, the predicted mobility rate of
individuals who are expecting a child is more than twice that of individuals
who are not expecting (the row difference in column 1). In contrast,
among those who do have employer-provided health insurance, individuals
who are expecting have a predicted mobility rate 31 percent lower than
those who are not expecting. The effect of job-lock using the row




Wife not pregnant .242(.026) .097 (.012)
Wife pregnant .502(.147) .067 (.040)
Estimates of Job-Lock
a. Row difference among 30.9%(37.8)
those with HI
b. Simple difference-in- 138.7% (51.8)
difference
c. Adjusted difference-in- 66.7%(20.7)
difference
The simple difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of job-
lock is 139 percent, while the adjusted difference-in-difference estimate of
job-lock is 67 percent. In this case, the adjusted difference-in-difference
estimate makes much more sense than the simple difference-in-difference29
estimate because a reduction in mobility rates greater than 100 percent is
impossible.Evenso, because the effect of pregnancy on mobility is
positive for those without group employment health insurance and negative
for those with such insurance, the rationale for using either difference-in-
difference measure of job-lock is less compelling than when looking at
family size for evidence of job-lock.22 The last row of Table 5givesthe
row difference and the adjusted difference-in-difference measures of job-
lock for the other specifications which look at pregnancy.
Some may question whether a more accurate portrayal of the link
between pregnancy and job mobility is one in which individuals find the
"good" job which offers health insurance and then decide to have children.
To the extent that this type of behavior occurs, it should lead to an
underestimate of the magnitude of job-lock because it suggests that among
those with health insurance, those who are expecting a child will have
lower job tenure than those who are not, and the previous literature on
job-mobility has consistently found a negative relationship between tenure
and job turnover.23
22ThiS is particularly true if part of the mobility differential among
those without insurance between those who are expecting and those who
are not is motivated by the former group trying to find jobs with health
insurance (this would be a kind of reverse job-lock).
23Calculations by the author using data from the May 1988 Current
Population Survey show that the fraction of men with a child under the age
of one is roughly equal for all tenure levels between one and five years,
even after controlling for age. This suggests that most children are not
conceived in response to their parents having found a good job and the
bias created by this type of behavior is therefore not likely to be
significant.30
I attempted to confirm my results of pregnancy-related job-lock by
estimating a hazard model of voluntary mobility using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This dataset has the
advantage of precisely dating (month, day and year) both job changes and
births. The measured effect of job-lock using the NLSY was the "wrong"
sign, although the standard error on the interaction between pregnancy and
employer-provided health insurance was so large that it precluded making
any inferences. An attempt to reconcile the differing results from these
two datasets was not particularly fruitful, although there is some
suggestion that the lack of evidence for job-lock in the NLSY is due partly
to the fact that most of the births were first births.
Following the framework in Section II, Holtz-Eakin [1993] also
examines the issue of job-lock. In contrast to the results presented above,
his analysis using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
gives little evidence of job-lock. These differences may be attributable to
disparities in data quality between the NMES and the PSID. The PSID is
known to have noisy and often inconsistent measures of job turnover
which result from questions on job tenure that are somewhat ambiguous.
Brown and Light [19921 show that the coefficients from probit estimation
using PSID turnover measures as the dependent variable are quite
sensitive, both in sign and magnitude, to how one cleans the data. In
contrast, the NMES data on turnover is derived from questions asked each
quarter about an individual's actual place of employment. Aggregate
measures of turnover in the NMES are quite similar to those derived from
the CPS and the SIPP for a similar time period.31
D. Specification Checks
Thereis one variable which should perhaps be included in all of
the mobility equations that is missing, and that is tenure. Unfortunately,
the NMES did not survey participants about their job duration. If having
health insurance is correlated with tenure, the coefficients which I use to
identify job-lock could be biased by the omission of tenure. Applying the
standard formula for omitted variables in a probit [Yatchew and Griliches,
19851, I estimate that the omission of tenure biases the coefficient on
health insurance and the other coefficients related to job-lock by at most
30 percent. Correcting for these biases does not change the conclusion
that there is substantial insurance-related job-lock.
The estimates of job-lock found in all three experiments are robust
to general changes in specification.Estimating a logit or a linear
probability model of turnover rather than a probit does not change things
substantively. Using education dummies rather than a linear education
variable does not change the estimates of job-lock. Likewise, adding an
experience-squared term or weighting the data do not change the estimates
of job-lock.
Table 6 compares the estimated impact of job-lock from the three
different experiments. As noted previously, we should expect to see more
evidence of job-lock among individuals with higher expected medical
expenses. Columns 3 and 4 give the estimated impact of job-lock, while
column 5 lists the expected family medical expenses for the group
specified in each experiment. While there appears to be little relationship
between the effect of job-lock based on I2+I3andexpected medical
expenses, the effect using /33 and expected medical expenses are highly
correlated. For example, the effect of job-lock based on /33 from the other32
health insurance experiment is 66 percent that from the family size
experiment, and expected medical expenses for other health insurance are
80 percent those of family size. Similarly, the effect of job-lock from the
family size experiment is 51 percent the effect of usingfrom the
pregnancy experiment, while expected medical costs are 54percentof
those for an expectant family. This suggests that the difference in the
mobility rates of the control and the experimental group between those
with health insurance and those without health insurance is largely
accounted for by differences in expected medical costs faced by these
groups.
V. Conclusions
The evidence presented above suggests that there is substantial
health insurance-related job-lock. The change in mobility from having
other health insurance is 25percentgreater for those with employer-
provided health insurance than for those without employer-provided health
insurance. In addition, individuals with larger families are less likely to
leave their jobs if they have health insurance than if they do not. And
finally, while having a wife who is pregnant increases mobility among
those with no health insurance, it reduces mobility substantially (30
percent to 40 percent) for those who have employer-provided health
insurance. These results are robust to changes in specification and in the
sample over which they are estimated.
Estimating the welfare consequences associated with job-lock is a
more difficult issue. Although an explicit welfare calculation is beyond
the scope of this paper, there are three factors to consider in evaluating the
implications of job-lock for economic efficiency. The first is whether33
there is an important match specific component to individual productivity.
If job turnover results in increased match quality between workers and
firms, job-lock will result in a loss of economic efficiency. In contrast,
if workers are essentially "replaceable", job-lock will only affect the
distribution of output. To the extent that job-lock does lower productivity,
a second important consideration is whether these losses are temporary or
permanent. While pregnancy is a preexisting condition that comes and
goes in a matter of months, some of individuals facing job-lock will be
affected by conditions that last for years.
Finally, some might ask whether job-lock is a benefit, rather than
a cost, for firms. If firms make job-specific investments in worker human
capital, they may want to reduce turnover among their employees. This
is a commonly cited reason for employer provision of pensions. The
effect of job-lock, however, is separate from the general mobility reducing
effect that results from the provision of fringe benefits because it is the
workers with high expected medical expenses who will be most likely to
stay. Presumably the firm would rather reduce turnover among workers
with low expected medical expenses than among those with high expected
medical expenses. More importantly, job-lock is not created by the firm
but is imposed by the benefit policies of other firms, either because other
firms exclude preexisting conditions or, less frequently, because they do
not offer health insurance.REFERENCES
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Sources of Health Insurance Coverage
Fraction with
Fraction who haveemployer coverage
coverage through: who also have:
Own employment 75.0% 100%
Spouse's employment 33.5 36.0
Union 4.5 0.5
Other group policy 0.4 0.3
Non-group policy 2.3 0.6
CHAMPUS 2.1 1.7
Medicaid 0.5 0.0
Any non-employer source 41.0 37.5
Author's calculation using a sample of 2978 married men from the
1987 National Medcial Expenditure Survey.TABLE II
Descriptive Statistics
(1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey)
Standard
Variable Mean ErrorMini mum Maximum
Union 0.25 0.432 0 1
Black 0.15 0.359 0 1
Education 12.88 2.930 0 18
Experience 19.18 9.110 0 47
Hourlywage $11.53 $7.23 $1.06$192.31
Log hourly wage 2.30 0.554 0.06 5.26
Log family income 10.51 0.808 0 12.99
Log wife's income 7.72 0.332 0 12.52
Health Insurance 0.75 0.432 0 1
Other Health Insurance 0.41 0.49 1 0 1
Family Size 3.36 0.121 2 12
Pregnant 0.06 0.246 0 1
Author's calculation using a sample of 2978 married men from the 1987


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Other HI 2 children .171 .211 $2318
Family Size4 children .462.318 $2892
Pregnancy 1 child .201 .619 $5371
expecting another
'The estimated effect of job-lock for other health insurance is
taken from column 3 of Table 5.Forfamily size, the coefficients
from column I of Table 9 are multiplied by 6, the family size of
the base group. in the case of pregnancy, the coefficients from
column 2 of Table 10 are multiplied by .75 (the fraction of ayear
for which an expectant mother is pregnant).
bForother health insurance and family size, expected medical
expenses of $287 for children and $872 for adults are taken from
Table 5ofManning et al. (1987). For pregnancy, expected
medical expense is calculated as the cost of I child and 2 adults
from Manning et a!. plus the average cost of pregnancy and
delivery of $3340 (Health Insurance Association of America 1989;
deflated by the medical care CPI between 1984 and 1988).